Australian Elections Wishlist from AEC

The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) has asked for change.

Consider the AEC Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters 2025 Inquiry into the 2025 federal election

The entire AEC submission (004) is available on the JSCEM website.

Recommendations I have copied from the AEC document (and I agree, with one caution):

Improving the voter experience

13. Options that JSCEM, political parties and candidates may consider include:
a) publicly pledging to their own code of conduct for their campaign and campaign workers and putting measures in place, such as online education resources, to help achieve the behavioural standards they are seeking to achieve
b) larger political parties agreeing to a coordinated and bipartisan approach to publicly commit to a code of conduct or similar that outlines the expected behaviours of their campaign workers
c) collaborating with the AEC to lead a consultative design process to develop a code of conduct for parties and candidates to publicly adopt, including measures for parties and candidates to implement to give it effect.

Third-party PVA

The AEC recorded over 357,000 redirections to the AEC website from third-party postal voting websites.
These websites required voters to add their details into an online form before being redirected to the AEC’s online postal vote application, providing third parties with sensitive personal data.
29. As with previous submissions,
1 the AEC again requests the JSCEM further consider legislation that either:
a) removes the option for any third-party to promote or send out PVAs both in hard copy or electronically (as recommended by the JSCEM Report into the Conduct of the 2022 federal election and other matters), or
b) allows third parties only to facilitate PVAs electronically and removes paper-based options, which will help reduce duplication and inefficiencies in processing, and reduce voter concerns about how their information has been captured.
31. If JSCEM considers the second option is the best approach, exemptions for political actors should also  be removed from the Privacy Act. This will mean that political parties, parliamentarians and candidates will have to provide notice to voters around the collection and use of their personal information. If these exemptions are not removed, then political parties should be required, specifically in relation to PVA forms, to make it clear to voters that they are not interacting directly with the AEC and that their data and application will be transferred to the AEC.
34. To strengthen public trust in political communication, the Spam Act 2003 (Cth) could be amended to ban political parties and other political participants from sending “spam messages” (should such an amendment not offend the implied freedom of political communication) or alternatively require those sending spam text messages for election campaigning to adhere to the Spam Act. This would require political parties to first obtain consent from recipients, properly identify themselves as the sender, and provide an easy way for recipients to unsubscribe.

Electoral roll access

41. Since the introduction of electronic inspection in 2004, the evolution of technology and
growth of social media mean the risks associated with facilitating the right of inspection via Public Access Terminals have increased considerably. The AEC has for some time been open and explicit about the challenges of facilitating the right of inspection while also maturing its privacy management practices. Due to the increasing number of large-scale data breaches in Australia, public expectations about the management and security of personal information have changed.
42. This change, together with the erosion of social cohesion since the COVID-19 pandemic,
suggests it is timely for the AEC to again consider the risks associated with PATs and the options available for mitigating these. The importance of such a review was underscored in June 2025, when it was reported via X (in a post the AEC has seen), that an activist group had made a public call for supporters to access AEC PATs to locate targets for, and then carry out, politically motivated violence.

61. It is timely to also review the AEC’s legislative and regulatory powers to try and keep pace, if not leap ahead and predict the information environment of elections into the next decade. The AEC would benefit from JSCEM’s consideration of the following:
a) whether section 329 of the Electoral Act can be reconstructed by parliament to apply
outside of the polling period and potentially to relate to misleading and deceptive
communication that relates to the electoral process (i.e. deliberately misleading others
about how an election is conducted) and the imitation of AEC colours and branding.
Paragraph 65
b) Legislatively requiring social media companies to adhere to minimum standards with
respect to how they discharge the following:
i. educate their platform users about digital literacy, specifically how to identify mis-
and disinformation in the context of an election
ii. respond to legislative breaches of the Electoral Act with minimum timeframes to
undertake the required action
iii. maintain minimum standards for an advertisement library that tracks all political
advertising and expenditure, so this is available to all voters in a consistent
format across platforms (applicable to platforms that continue to allow political
advertising).

Re Authorisations and communications
70. Some of the matters for JSCEM consideration include:
a) replacing the subjective dominant purpose test for “electoral matter” with an objective
standard
b) clarifying the nature of contraventions of the authorisation requirements and/or
strengthening penalties for unauthorised electoral communications, particularly having
regard to the recent High Court decision in Laming v Electoral Commissioner of the
Australian Electoral Commission [2025] HCA 31
c) clarifying and strengthening the investigatory powers of the AEC to enable the AEC to
more quickly gather evidence and make timely regulatory decisions in the fast-paced
electoral communications environment
d) extending regulatory powers in relation to authorisations, including relating to removing
signs in breach after appropriate warnings have been issued and non-compliance
continues
e) f) updating authorisation requirements to have a single, simple requirement for all different
types of communications
allowing abbreviations to be used in the authorisation statement, in certain
circumstances
g) h) requiring communication that contains a deepfake7 (e.g., AI generated images of another
candidate) to declare the presence of a deepfake in the authorisation to help voters
better understand and navigate the communication
clarifying the position on communications made through news media outlets by
disclosure entities
i) considering to what extent, if any, authorisations provisions should apply to podcasts and
influencers and whether the collaborative posting of podcasts by content creators and influencers with disclosure entities need to be authorised by the creator and the
disclosure entity.

Party registration
Para 73
Amendments to the Electoral Act could be made to:
a) b) c) d) e) clarify that all changes to the register should cease between the issue and return of
election writs apart from changes to party office bearers
clarify that notice of an application to register a political party can be published by the
Electoral Commissioner (rather than the Electoral Commission)
update the requirement to pay a fee for a change to the register to include applications to
add or change a party logo
extend the power to deregister a party for fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining
registration to permit deregistration for fraudulent information or misrepresentation
provided as part of a review of registration
clarify timeframes for review periods to ensure that review periods commence from the
date notice is provided rather than the date the decision came to the notice of an
individual
f) change the requirement to notify applicants by post, to a requirement to notify in writing.
This allows for electronic notification
g) streamline the registration process by reducing the timeframe for members to respond in
10 days rather than 30 days.
74. Additionally, it would be desirable to give legislative recognition to statistical membership
testing methodologies recommended by the Australian Bureau of Statistics and to broaden the
scope of matters to be considered in assessing an application for registration (for example, law
enforcement concerns).

Non-voter provisions

76. The requirement to post or deliver up to three notices to the last known address is costly and
relies on postal services that are increasingly limited in frequency and pose challenges in reaching
voters residing in more remote areas. The ability to send notices via electronic or other means
would enable the AEC to utilise modern communication methods that are more real-time, cost-
effective, reliable, and meet community needs and expectations.
77. The $20 administrative penalty for non-voting has not changed since 1991 and along with
the ACT, is the equal lowest non-voting penalty in Australia. JSCEM’s report on the conduct of the2016 federal election recommended a review of the penalty for non-voting. Consideration might be given to increasing the penalty for non-voting in line with Consumer Price Index (CPI) to reflect the significance of compulsory voting for Australia’s democratic processes and provide a stronger deterrence to non-voting than the current penalty amount.
Electoral offences
consideration of the following measures:
a) empowering the AEC to issue infringement notices (along similar lines to the power of
the Information Commissioner)
b) creating an offence prohibiting interference in an election (e.g., interference by domestic
or foreign actors using AI, cyber-attacks, or social media)
c) clarifying the legislative scope of the misleading or deceptive publications offence in
section 329 of the Electoral Act (as outlined above).

Complex count

Para 90
Changes to legislation may allow the AEC to provide faster results for both the House of
Representatives and the Senate without compromising the integrity of the count. Potential changes could include:
a) allowing pre-poll ordinary votes to be unfolded and sorted from 12pm on polling day and
permit the beginning of scrutiny prior to 6pm. Given the increasing trend in pre-poll
voting, this would significantly assist the AEC in providing earlier results on polling night
b) removing the requirement to conduct DRO Senate counts in out-posted centres. This will
enable faster dispatch of ballot papers to Senate scanning centres and an earlier
distribution of preferences
c) removing the requirement to conduct a TCP count in divisions with complex counts
where a distribution of preferences is required to determine the top two candidates.

Service footprint

97. The AEC recommends the removal of the eligibility criteria for pre-poll voting. Removing the
eligibility criteria for pre-poll will also:
a) reduce the confusion around the eligibility criteria and the ‘noise’ it creates that impacts
the voter when the most important focus needs to be on turnout and formality
b) promote consistency across in-person voting methods
c) enhance accessibility for voters with diverse needs and circumstances
d) align with modern voter expectations of access to flexible voting options.
101. There is also always a risk that a service may be impacted, and closed due to
environmental, health or other emergencies. JSCEM may wish to consider secure telephone voting
as a safety net for eligible voters affected by natural disasters or otherwise unable to access a voting service. The electronic assisted voting service – previously offered to blind and low vision voters and extended to those in Antarctica in 2022 – was adapted for the 2022 federal election and successfully expanded as a ‘secure telephone voting’ service to Australians isolating due to COVID-19.
102. Following the JSCEM’s inquiry into the 2022 federal election, they recommended the
Government expand Part XVB of the Electoral Act, to permanently enable more people to vote via
telephone.
105. Given the emergency nature of this requirement, JSCEM would need to consider who is best
placed to authorise the use of this alternative voting service, and the factors to be considered in
giving such an authorisation, including:
a) determining the smallest specific geographical area to be subject to a proposed
authorisation
b) the time period the authorisation would have effect
c) necessary consultation and notification processes.
Paragraph 107
There are a number of further potential changes to the Electoral Act which would improve
the efficiency of electoral operations overall, including:
a) permitting mobile voting on public holidays for teams appointed as pre-poll voting centres
b) removing the voter and witness signature requirement from a declaration vote if marked
off an ECL at the time of the vote being issued, to streamline the issuing of declaration
votes in the polling place or pre-poll voting centre
i) the Electoral Act could provide that the DRO, being satisfied of all the requirements
in Schedule 3 subparagraphs 6AA(a)–(d) being met, may take the envelope as being
signed
c) providing for additional scrutiny to occur prior to a recount decision, at the discretion of
the Electoral Commissioner (e.g., to conduct further scrutiny of informal ballot papers or
first preferences of the two lead candidates), to enable the AEC to take steps during the
process that could avoid the need for a formal full recount after counting is complete.

The above copied from the AEC document

Yours sincerely

Allen Hampton

Coburg

achamptonmob@gmail.com

NOTE:

I support the AEC "wishlist" but, if (paragraph 90) the scrutiny (count) of "ordinary pre-poll ballots" is to start early during the Saturday (Election Day), I hope serious attention will be given to the critical issue of the vital scrutineer role.